主讲人
Zihao Li Columbia University 时间 2026年6月16日 星期二 下午 14:00-15:00 地点 学院104会议室
Abstract An agent samples projects over time, observing quality for each, while a principal can select at most one. The principal values quality, whereas the agent only wants a project chosen. Transfers are unavailable, but the principal can verify quality by paying a cost. We fully characterize the dynamics of verification by deter-mining optimal mechanisms for this problem. With a low verification cost and a long horizon, the optimal mechanism involves a deterministic selection rule that initially discriminates on quality but chooses a project irrespective of its quality at a deadline. Verification occurs with an intermediate probability before the deadline, declining over time. We show how these conclusions change if the verification cost is high or the horizon is short, and under certain forms of imperfect commitment. Our analysisprovides guidelines on how dynamics interact with the benefits of verification. Biography Zihao Li is a Ph.D. student in Economics at Columbia University, advised by Professor Yeon-Koo Che and Professor Qingmin Liu. His research interests include microeconomic theory, dynamic games, information economics, and mechanism design. He received his undergraduate degrees in Mathematics and Statistics, as well as an M.S. in Statistics, from the University of Chicago. He also received an M.A. from Princeton University, where he was previously a Ph.D. student in Operations Research and Financial Engineering before transferring to Columbia Economics.
His research studies information, learning, and incentives in dynamic economic environments. His paper “The Dynamics of Verification when Searching for Quality,” coauthored with Jonathan A. Libgober, is forthcoming in the Review of Economic Studies. His work has also been presented at the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. He has served as a referee for the American Economic Review and The RAND Journal of Economics, and as a Program Committee member for EC’26.
